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BACKGROUND
THE 1972 MONTANA CONSTITUTION IN
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Richard Roeder*
To those not familiar with the record, Montana's adoption of a
new constitution on June 6, 1972, may have appeared as the climax
of a sudden thrust for change. In reality, it was the culmination of
decades of intermittent but mounting concern about the adequacy
of the 1889 Montana Constitution as fundamental law for the fu-
ture. The story begins in the 1889 Constitutional Convention.
The 1889 Constitutional Convention has yet to be subjected to
careful, critical scrutiny. Those few who have written about it have
emphasized the debate over the hiring of a stenographer to record
the proceedings as a conspiracy of silence-which it was not-to
hide a scheme to protect mining interests from paying their fair
share of taxes.1
Long, tedious debates in the 1889 convention do reflect real
differences of opinion and divisions among groups of delegates. But
to focus on disagreement is to miss the far more fundamental fact
of consensus. The delegates of 1889 thought they were laying the
legal foundation for a new commonwealth with bright prospects.
They were, therefore, codifying into fundamental law what they
* B.A. Swarthmore College, 1953; M.A. History, University of Pennsylvania, 1957; Ph.
D. history, University of Pennsylvania, 1971. Mr. Roeder served as a member of the Consti-
tutional Convention Revision Committee and later as a delegate to the 1972 Constitutional
Convention. Mr. Roeder also has written several pieces including MONTANA: A HISTORY OF
Two CENTURIES (co-written with Michael P. Malone) and portions of THE LAST BEST PLACE:
A MONTANA ANTHOLOGY (W. Kittredge & A. Smith ed. 1988). Currently, Mr. Roeder is the
Professor Emeritus at Montana State University and is an adjunct professor at Carroll Col-
lege in Helena.
1. J. HOWARD, MONTANA HIGH, WIDE, AND HANDSOME 60-64 (1943). The necessary cor-
rective to HOWARD is Smurr, The Montana 'Tax Conspiracy' of 1889, (parts 1 & 2), MON-
TANA: THE MAGAZINE OF WESTERN HISTORY, vol. 2, Spr. at 46-53 & vol. 3, Sum. at 47-56
(1955).
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saw as the primary object of political action, namely to facilitate
economic development. They were also addressing problems that
twenty-five years of territorial experience had revealed and trying
to surmount fears of popular government common to the nation at
that time.
The taxation of mines was not a real issue in the 1889 Consti-
tutional Convention. A net proceeds tax had long been present in
the territorial statutes, and as a constitutional issue it had been
fought out and resolved in the 1884 constitutional convention to
the satisfaction of mining interests.2 The major opponent of a spe-
cial privilege for mines in 1884, Joseph K. Toole, had changed his
mind by 1889 and had become a supporter. That a special mines
tax would be a part of the new constitution was a foregone conclu-
sion that almost all delegates recognized as necessary for continued
mining prosperity, the keystone to the new state's immediate eco-
nomic development.
Although not previously discussed to any length, the debate as
to whether Montana should provide a tax break for irrigation cor-
porations reveals both the consensus on the desirability of eco-
nomic development and the disagreement on the best means to
this end.' Mining and the integrated metals industry that Marcus
Daly was developing had provided a large measure of prosperity
for the territory of Montana. The territory, however, had benefit-
ted enormously from the then recent decline of Nevada's Comstock
Lode which had brought miners and businessman north. The dele-
gates were fully aware of Nevada's fate and that boom and bust
could occur equally as well in Montana. One particularly acute way
this awareness manifested itself was the reference by residents to
Butte as the "camp" or the "Big Butte Camp," but a "camp" nev-
ertheless. The delegates realized that the future prosperity of the
state called for some more permanent economic foundation. They
believed the best alternative was agriculture; it might provide the
long and continued economic prosperity that mining could not.
At the time, a significant future for agriculture seemed possi-
ble only with further development of irrigation systems. What
could be done on an individual or small-scale, local basis had al-
ready been accomplished. What was needed was to harness Mon-
tana's major rivers through the construction of storage reservoirs,
2. TAXATION-NET PROCEEDS OF MINES, Laws, Resolutions and Memorials of the Ter-
ritory of Montana Passed at the Eleventh Regular Session of the Legislative Assembly, 65-
68 (1879).
3. See generally PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 479-
512 and 551-71 (1921).
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canals, and extensive ditch systems. All of this, however, would re-
quire enormous outlays of capital. Where would it come from?
Some delegates saw an easy fix in a tax break, believing that a tax
break for irrigation corporations similar to that for mining would
attract automatically the necessary investment. The upshot of this
proposal was one of the most extended and heated debates of the
convention.
Opponents of the tax break prevailed. Some of them, such as
former territorial delegate Martin Maginnis, predicted that only
the federal government would be capable of the investment neces-
sary for such significant irrigation projects. The tax break debates
nevertheless reveal a consensus that had prevailed through the
twenty-five years of territorial experience: the primary purpose of
the government was to facilitate economic development, and the
political process determined which groups would benefit most im-
mediately and directly from that development.
The delegates also saw the constitutional convention as an op-
portunity to address problems that had arisen in the twenty-five
years of territorial government. One of the most important of
these-and an issue that evoked some of the longer de-
bates-related to the territorial system of justice. In 1889, Mon-
tana employed a federal system of district courts and a supreme
court for the territory. The delegates were concerned that district
judges sat together as a supreme court, and reviewed their own
work at the appellate level. Perhaps more importantly, the territo-
rial court system had been costly and inefficient. Territorial courts
had been hopelessly overworked and far behind on their calendars.
Also because courts were few in number, citizens often had to
travel great distances, and often suffered costly delays. Hence, the
delegates sought to create a new court system which would be less
costly and more readily available.4
The proceedings of the constitutional convention also amply
show the delegates' fear of popular government. Public life since
the Civil War had revealed an alarming tendency of government to
succumb to costly corruption, as politicians in local, state, and na-
tional governments had used their positions to rob public treasur-
ies and fatten themselves and their friends. The work of the 1889
delegates illustrates a determination to forestall such develop-
ments in Montana. To this end, the delegates wrote a long consti-
tution full of details designed to protect the new state from the
corruption of the east by attempting to ensure frugality and hon-
4. Id. at 276-329.
[Vol. 51
3
Roeder: The 1972 Montana Constitution in Historical Context
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1990
BACKGROUND
esty in government. The legislature would meet for short biennial
terms; its actions confined by detailed restrictions on taxation, in-
debtedness, and special local laws. If the legislature were to meet
infrequently, the argument went, its capacity for damage would be
diminished; and when it did meet, its actions would be limited by
detailed restrictions.
Similarly, the executive branch would be divided among seven
major elective officers who presumably would check and balance
each other. While the 1889 Constitution proclaimed that the "su-
preme executive power of the state shall be vested in the gover-
nor," delegates agreed that the office would be largely ceremonial.5
The executive branch would actually function through a system of
ex officio boards and commissions where the elective officers could
study and watch each other as if in a public poker game. Delegate
fear of popular government eventually resulted in a fundamental
law characterized by minutiae and statutory detail.
After thirty-seven days of labor, the 1889 delegates were proud
of their work. They believed they had solved some old problems
and provided for an expanding future. In his valedictory, conven-
tion President William A. Clark judged that they had laid a legal
foundation for ages to come. Clark's prophecy proved to be wide of
the mark. The 1889 Constitution was becoming obsolete almost
upon its adoption, its inadequacy becoming apparent within the
first generation of statehood. The shortcomings of the constitution
emerged partially because Americans were beginning to demand
more from their government. At the time of statehood, citizens had
limited expectations-a minimum of law and order, a criminal jus-
tice system, and a facilitation of commercial transactions. Conven-
tion debates impart these limited expectations, exemplified by the
delegates' characterization of the governor's office as part-time and
ceremonial.'
On the eve of statehood, however, Montanans and citizens
around the nation were on the threshold of a new era. The popu-
lism of the 1890s and the progressive movement of the early twen-
tieth century made new demands on the political system and
vastly expanded the involvement of government in the lives of its
citizens. Even a cursory glance at legislative journals and session
laws attests to these changes. As time went on, the volumes grew
thicker and the statutes addressed more varied subjects. During
5. MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. VII § 5. For a discussion of the executive article see
Roeder, Energy in the Executive, 33 MONT. L. REv. 1, 1-13 (1972).
6. This expectation evolved from the experience of territorial days, when public duties
left the governor with ample time to pursue other professional and business interests.
1990]
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the 1890s, for example, the public demanded that laws such as
boiler inspections and mine safety measures be used to cushion the
harsher aspects of the new, industrial, capitalism and provide some
protection for workers. During the early twentieth century, such
demands expanded to include railway safety measures, an eight-
hour work day, and the replacement of the legal doctrines gov-
erning industrial-accident liability with a workmen's compensation
system.
During this time of interest in reform, citizens also demanded
purification of the political process. To accomplish this, the citi-
zens sought to diminish the role of political parties, and to make
the political process more responsive to popular will through such
devices as direct primary nominations and a constitutional amend-
ment for direct legislation through initiative and referendum. The
early years of the twentieth century also saw mounting insistence
that our society be made more moral and humane through a public
health system, child labor laws, a juvenile court system, and com-
pulsory school attendance laws, along with the outlawing of gam-
bling, saloons, and prostitution.
As the Montana Legislature, session by session, responded fa-
vorably to what seemed like reasonable and overwhelming de-
mands for reform, it created a fragmented, unplanned but steadily
expanding bureaucracy. In 1889-1890, Montana's executive branch
consisted of approximately twenty officers, commissions, and
boards. By 1920, this number had increased to over one hundred.
This kind of government growth was not unique to Montana; it
was a national phenomenon characteristic at all levels of govern-
ment. A consequence of a growing local and national awareness of
government expansion was an efficiency and reorganization move-
ment that began in 1910 when President Taft appointed a Com-
mission on Economy and Efficiency. The following year, Wisconsin
set up a similar body; many other states, including Montana, soon
followed Wisconsin's example.'
Montana found itself in the mainstream of the movement. By
1910, legislators started to recognize that somehow they had cre-
ated a large, uncontrolled executive branch. After some partisan
bickering about how the other party had created government posi-
tions for the party faithful, there emerged an essentially nonparti-
san concern about what to do with the bureaucracy that the legis-
lature had created. This concern resulted in intermittent study
groups and reorganization efforts that finally culminated in the
7. Roeder, Energy in the Executive, 33 MONT. L. REv. 1, 4 (1972).
[Vol. 51
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successful executive reorganization and constitutional reform of
the early 1970s.
In 1919, for example, the legislature created a State Efficiency
and Trade Commission. In its report to Governor Sam V. Stewart,
the commission made several recommendations for administrative
change, but it observed that constitutional obstacles in the form of
boards manned ex officio by elective officers were "insuperable in
any attempt to carry out a . . . scheme of reorganization." Simi-
larly, in his state-of-the-state message of 1921, Governor Joseph
Dixon's recommended changes included animadversions on Mon-
tana's constitution. Dixon said he would ask for a constitutional
convention bill if he thought there was any chance for its passage.'
But that would have to wait for another half century.9 Interest in
governmental change declined after 1921, even though interest in
establishing an accounting system and an office of the state con-
troller remained.
During the 1940s and 1950s, partly in response to the expan-
sion of government that accompanied New Deal programs, interest
in government reorganization revived and expanded. For instance,
the 1941 Legislature set up a Select Committee on State Govern-
ment, which reported that "Constitutional limitations make any
immediate complete re-organization impossible." The legislature
followed up by creating a Governor's Committee on Reorganization
and Economy to report to the 1943 Legislature. To assist it, the
Governor's Committee hired Griffenhagen and Associates, who
produced a 1,400-page report containing numerous suggestions for
change, including basic constitutional amendments.
In addition to the various study groups outlined above, the
legislature also began to recognize the inadequacies of the 1889
Constitution. Bills providing for constitutional amendments sug-
gest the legislature's dissatisfaction with the state's basic law. As
early as 1901, legislators introduced eight bills for amendments,
and the number continued to increase to as many as fifteen in
1921. During the late 1920s, interest in constitutional change ap-
parently slackened, but during the Great Depression amendment
bills increased each session, reaching twenty-two in 1935. The
number of bills dropped off again during World War II, but the
number reached eighteen in 1949 and rose to a new high of thirty-
8. Message of Governor Joseph M. Dixon to 1921 Montana Legislature, 1, 20-21 (copy
located at the UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA SCHOOL OF LAW).
9. In 1945, Leo Graybill, Sr., introduced the first unsuccessful bill for a referendum
vote on the holding of a constitutional convention. H.B. 241, 29th Mont. Leg. (1945).
1990]
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The amendment process, however, was not generally a source
of significant constitutional change. Many of the early proposed
amendments addressed detailed problems, such as the taxation
and indebtedness powers of local governments or the terms and
salaries of local government officials. In other words, the specificity
of the 1889 Constitution bred a need for adjusting details. The
limit of three amendments on the general election ballot also se-
verely limited constitutional change through the amendment pro-
cess. Despite numerous amendment proposals in nearly every legis-
lative session during the twentieth century, seldom did three
proposals reach the voters. Because of the limit of three, legislative
leaders generally delayed passage of amendment bills until the end
of the session in order to broker which three to pass. In the crush
of the final hours of a session, however, most were lost.
During the post-World War II period, citizens interested in
problems of state government broadened their concerns to include
examination of the legislative and judicial branches as well as the
executive. In 1949, the first amendment bill for annual sessions of
the legislature appeared.11 From the early 1950s to 1972, the man-
ner in which the legislature operated became an object of concern
to knowledgeable legislators and interested citizens. Nationally as
well as locally, the 1950s reflected a broad interest in the Legisla-
tive Council movement as an alternative to more fundamental
change. The state Supreme Court declared Montana's first legisla-
tive council law unconstitutional, 12 but a new bill in 1957 suc-
ceeded in establishing the Legislative Council."3 The Council itself
proved to be a medium for governmental change as evidenced by
council reports of the early 1960s advocating executive
reorganization.
Despite Legislative Council efforts to improve the legislative
process, some citizens continued to express dissatisfaction with the
legislature's work. During the late 1960s, citizen groups joined with
interested legislators in focusing on the legislature's failings as an
10. See e.g., MONT. CONST. REVISION COMM., Constitutional Amendments Introduced
in the Legislative Assembly 1889-1969.
11. H.B. 221, 31st Mont. Leg. (1949) (introduced by Representative Page of Missoula).
At this time, some people expressed interest in an unicameral legislature. S.B. 94, 31st
Mont. Leg. (1949) (introduced by Senators Tripp and Burns).
12. State ex rel Mitchell v. Holmes, 128 Mont. 275, 277, 274 P.2d 611, 613 (1954)
(court by a vote of three to two declared 1953 Mont. Laws 143 unconstitutional which had
created a Legislative Council).
13. State ex rel James v. Aronson, 132 Mont. 120, 314 P.2d 849 (1957) (court by a vote
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institution. In 1966, the Montana-Idaho Assembly on the State
Legislature (an Idaho-Montana citizens group brought together
under the aegis of Columbia University's American Assembly) rec-
ommended that all constitutional limits on the length and fre-
quency of legislative sessions be eliminated.14 Similarly, in a report
to the 1967 Legislature, the Montana Citizens Committee on the
State Legislature (a broad-based group organized in August 1966
with the assistance of the Citizens Conference on State Legisla-
tures of Kansas City, Missouri) recommended changes, including
annual sessions.15 In another of its reports, the Citizens Committee
advocated numerous changes to the 1969 Legislature, including a
smaller legislature, single-member districts, and annual sessions.'"
This broadening interest in governmental change did not ig-
nore Montana's court system. Unfortunately, prior to the adoption
of the 1972 Constitution, the amendment process was of little use
in securing court reform. Only two court amendments had ever
been approved. In 1900, voters decided to allow a future legislature
to increase the size of the Supreme Court from three to five and to
allow district judges to sit for disqualified supreme court judges.
Finally in 1964, voters took the bold step of ratifying an amend-
ment that removed the prohibition against an increase in a judge's
salary during the judge's term in office.
Although only two amendments were ever ratified, several
other attempts to amend the judicial article were made. In 1945,
the first comprehensive judicial amendment was introduced in the
House. The measure, which never got out of committee, would
have replaced the popular election of judges with nomination by a
judicial committee and appointment by the governor. In 1951 and
1957, attempts to give the legislature power to amend Montana's
inferior court system also failed. In 1962, the electorate rejected a
constitutional amendment that would have permitted the legisla-
ture to eliminate justice courts and police and municipal courts.
1
7
But as in other areas of government, interest in court reform
would not disappear. In the early fall of 1966, a group of Montana
citizens in Great Falls, with the support of the American Judica-
ture Society, organized a Citizens' Conference on the Montana Ju-
dicial System for an intensive three-day study of the workings of
14. MONT.-IDAHo ASSEMBLY ON STATE LEGISLATURES, Report & Recommendations, 1-4
(Dec. 1966).
15. MONTANA CITIZENS COMMIrrEE ON THE STATE LEGISLATURE, Report to the Fortieth
Legislative Assembly of the State of Montana, 8 (Jan. 1967).
16. Id. at 9, 13, 19.
17. Loring, Constitutional Revision and the Judiciary, 2 MONT. PUB. AFF. REP. (1968)
(available in archives division of the University of Montana Mansfield Library).
1990] 267
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Montana's court system. The conference's recommendations in-
cluded replacing justice of the peace courts and police judges with
deputy judges chosen by district judges, adoption of a merit sys-
tem for selecting judges, and a unified court system headed by the
chief justice of the state supreme court.
Some of the participants in the Judicial Conference subse-
quently organized the Montana Citizens for Court Improvement.
Although the bills that the Citizens for Court Improvement sup-
ported failed to pass in the 1967 Legislature, the group continued
to function and received additional support from the University of
Montana School of Law. The fall 1967 issue of the Montana Law
Review carried Montana's Judicial System-A Blueprint for
Modernization, by David R. Mason and William F. Crowley.18
Professors Mason and Crowley followed this article with a sum-
mary piece in the fall 1968 issue of the University of Montana's
Bureau of Government Research periodical, Montana Public
Affairs.19
In the fall of 1971, the University of Montana, in cooperation
with the Montana Bar Association, held a third citizens confer-
ence. The conference resulted in the drafting of a Montana Plan,
which, after five years of consultation among citizens, judges, and
lawyers, was presented to the Constitutional Convention.2 The ob-
ject of the plan was a unified court system, a district court level of
justice in all cases, and selection of qualified judges by merit.
Finally, constitutional change was fostered over many decades
by the needs of local government. Counties and municipal corpora-
tions labored under the heavy weight of a judicially imposed Dil-
lon's Rule, and the pinch-penney control of a rurally dominated
legislature that showed little sympathy for the needs of cities and
towns. A few bright spots did exist, however, such as legislation
that allowed a county manager plan as adopted in Petroleum
County, and the unsuccessful early attempts at city-county consol-
idation by Butte and Silver Bow County.
Legislative reapportionment of the mid-1960s helped release
new pressures to address urgent urban problems and raised new
possibilities of constitutional reform as a means of vitalizing local
as well as state government. By the late 1960s, it was clear that
many forces, some dating almost back to the beginnings of state-
18. 29 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1967).
19. 2 MONT. PUB. AFF. REP. (1968) (available in archives division of the University of
Montana Mansfield Library).
20. For a discussion of the convention's treatment of the judiciary see Bowman, The
Judicial Article: What Went Wrong?, infra this issue.
[Vol. 51
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hood and others of more recent origin, were converging to support
wholesale constitutional reform. This brief summary of events can-
not pretend to be exhaustive of these factors. It ignores, among
many others, the sale of the Anaconda Company press and the
very important part played by the fleeting vitality of the Lee chain
of newspapers. I hope though that this summary will suggest that
constitutional reform was not a matter of a moment, but the com-
ing together of the interests and concerns of many groups and indi-
viduals, all of whom were seeking the unattainable ideal of effec-
tive self-government-an ideal that, while ever elusive, as good
citizens, we ought ever to pursue.
10
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